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Short literature notices
Gazzaniga, M.S.: 2005, The ethical brain. New
York: Dana Press, 225 pages, ISBN 1-932594-01-9,
Price: $25.
The rapid progress in neuroscience has posed new
and stimulating challenges to current ethical deci-
sion-making, anthropological constructs and nor-
mative criteria. These challenges are now
articulated and commented on in a sweeping,
popularly written overview by Michael S. Gazzan-
iga, who seems to bring the best expertise for such
an overview as a professor of cognitive neurosci-
ence at Dartmouth College (USA) and member of
the US Presidents Council on Bioethics.
Beginning with ‘‘lifespan neuroethics’’, he con-
siders how knowledge about brain development
might help to deﬁne human life and thus shed new
light on the controversy about conferring moral
status on an embryo. He ﬁnally opts for the eighth
week as the beginning of human life, although
without giving any ethical argumentation for this,
rather grounding it on a ‘‘gut reaction’’ (page 8)
which is in self-admitted contradiction even to
neuroscientiﬁc knowledge. This chapter is closed
with a discussion on the ethical challenges that
emerge as the brain ages. Gazzaniga proposes that
society should provide mechanisms for personal
choice regarding the option of euthanasia, yet once
again does not support this thesis with any ethical
arguments.
In the chapters about enhancement, Gazzaniga
opens up a distinction between physical enhance-
ment (enhancement of the body) and mental
enhancement (enhancement of the brain and
mind), rejecting the former, but welcoming the
latter in a naively optimistic way. A clear justiﬁ-
cation for why this distinction should hold - either
in descriptive or in normative terms – is missing.
In chapters on free will, personal responsibility,
and the law Gazzaniga argues that the issue of
responsibility is a social choice to which neurosci-
ence cannot contribute (pages 101–102). This thesis
is based on the assumption that neuroscience
would only study brains, which are ‘‘automatic,
rule-governed, determined devices’’, but not
people, who are ‘‘personally responsible agents,
free to make their own decisions’’(page 90). Such
an argumentation reveals (i) a problematic dualism
between the brain and the person, and (ii) a
striking dichotomy between determinism and free
will. The large amount of current literature about
naturalist perspectives on personhood and free will
is completely ignored.
The ﬁnal chapters of the book claim that there
was a universal nature of moral beliefs. The
universality would result from ‘‘common subcon-
scious mechanisms that are activated in all mem-
bers of our species in response to moral challenges’’
(page 172). Based on the fact that such an intrinsic
universal ethics was allegedly implemented in our
brains, it would be guaranteed that the whole
human endeavour will come to a good end: ‘‘In the
end, we humans are good at adapting to what
works, what is good and beneﬁcial, and, in the end,
jettisoning the unwise, the intemperate, the silly
and self-aggrandizing behaviours’’ (page 53).
To sum up, the issues raised in this book are
indeed of major importance for science, ethics and
society and they do deserve explicit interdisciplin-
ary ethical investigations. But this challenging task
can certainly not be achieved so simply. Gazzaniga
neglects not only the ethical research on the issues
he discusses, but even the most basic ethical
distinctions such as between ‘‘is’’ and ‘‘should’’
or between descriptive and normative ethics.
Matthis Synofzik
Tu¨bingen, Germany
Hildt, E.: 2006, Autonomie in der biomedizinischen
Ethik: Genetische Diagnostik und selbstbestimmte
Lebensgestaltung. Campus Verlag. 530 pages. EAN
9783593380117. Price: Euro 59.
InthisextensivebookElisabethHildtdeals,inmore
than 500 pages, with the concept of autonomy and
the principle of respect for autonomy, especially in
the context of genetic diagnosis. Hildts book
consists of ﬁve parts and the overall structure of
argumentation is straightforward and clear.
In the ﬁrst part she focuses on the biomedical
ethics as a genuine interdisciplinary ﬁeld of
research. After a short discussion of the relation
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short discussion of the function of justiﬁcation,
Hildt presents the main structure of principlism
which is understood as a version of coherentism in
ethics. In the second part the notion of autonomy
is analysed and different philosophical conceptions
are discussed. In this part the relation between the
concepts of autonomy, freedom and personhood
are analysed. In the third section Hildt takes the
conception of informed consent as the speciﬁc
version wherein the autonomy of a patient is
manifest in medical contexts. In this part the
central elements of informed consent are distin-
guished and presented to the reader. Then the
principle of respect for autonomy (taken as
informed consent) is put into context with other
important principles in biomedical ethics: beneﬁci-
ence and justice. In the fourth part, which is the
most extended one covering nearly half of the
book, Hildt applies this overall ethical and meta-
ethical framework of principlism. The topic now is
predictive genetic diagnosis. In this part she ﬁrstly
informs the reader about this medical technique
and then she analyses the different ethical aspects
which come into play here. The huge material is
organised along a temporal axis: ethical questions
rising before the test and after the test are
distinguished. The former includes the right to
know and not to know, the latter the question how
an autonomous person should deal with the genetic
knowledge gained by these tests. The fourth section
is devoted to the special context prenatal genetic
diagnostics and deals with the question how
reproduction and autonomy are related to each
other. In the ﬁnal section of part four Hildt tries to
draw some overall conclusions, asking how auton-
omy and responsibility should be related in this
context and dealing with the question whether
genetic knowledge increases the possibilities
for personal autonomy or causes the danger of
paternalism.
Hildts main interest lies in the concept of
autonomy and her main strategy is not to confront
autonomy and the social nature of human beings
but to emphasize that autonomy should be under-
stood as essentially social. Due to this in the fourth
part of her book Hildt is interested in demonstrat-
ing how solidarity, social embeddings and personal
autonomy should go together to overcome the
shortcomings in current biomedical ethics which
are caused by an insufﬁcient conception of auton-
omy. Therefore the conclusion Hildt gives in the
ﬁfth part of her book emphasises once more the
need for and the usefulness of a rich (or thick)
concept of personal autonomy. Thereby she shows
persuasively that autonomy should not be reduced
to informed consent and cannot be spelled out in
purely individualistic terms. Since I have developed
the concept of personal autonomy along similar
lines I am basically in sympathy with Hildts
account. Her book shows the ethical importance
and the power of a thick concept of autonomy.
Nevertheless: Read from a philosophers point of
view Hildts discussion of the philosophical theo-
ries is not satisfying since she is not discussing the
arguments and objections against such a thick
concept of autonomy although she refers them.
This is, at least in a philosophical book, a serious
omission. But readers with less philosophical
interest or readers who want to get a detailed
overview on the ethical problems in human genet-
ics will ﬁnd this book to be helpful.
Michael Quante
Ko¨ln, Germany
Parens, E. (ed.): 2006, Surgically Shaping Children.
Technology, Ethics, and the Pursuit of Normality.
Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University
Press. 274 pages. ISBN 0-8018-8305-9.
Erik Parens is known as a very careful and
balanced ethicist and researcher in the ﬁeld of
bioethics. This reputation stems, from my point of
view, for the most part from the pioneering reader
entitled Enhancing Human Traits, which he edited
in 1998. The title and some of the articles of the
new reader suggest a continuation of this work.
However, it is questionable whether surgically
shaping children is the best title for the book,
because the reader is a result of a research project
on treatment possibilities for Achondroplasia,
children with atypical genitalia and craniofacial
surgeries for cleft lips and palates. Although one
should always be careful to attribute deviant bodily
states the titles of diseases or handicaps, this seems
to be appropriate in the named cases. Even if one
takes a relatively fundamental understanding of
health and disease such as the absence of pain,
bodily functioning and coping with daily routine,
there will often be the necessity for therapeutic
interventions in these cases. Therefore, it would
have been helpful for readers of the book, who are
less familiar with the discussion on a distinction
between medical treatment and enhancement to
invest some additional work on conceptual and
analytical issues. And there remain some doubts,
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treat these bodily states with, for example, cosmetic
surgery for more beautiful feet such as described in
the article of Arthur W. Frank. Nevertheless, the
reader gives a lot of valuable examples towards the
thesis that the motivation for treating deviant
bodily states stems at least from two normative
sources: one objectivist-medical source, which
argues from the point of view of bodily function-
ing, the other the question of societal acceptance of
people with handicaps or deviant appearances. It is
important to distinguish both sources, because for
example in the case of atypical genitalia, the
problem of past treatment regimes obviously were
that physicians did not only try to achieve health
and proper bodily functioning, but also to give
children a sexual identity by surgical means –
which often went wrong. There is currently not
very much literature on the ethics of surgery, and
this makes the book an important starting point
for the ethical discussion between patients, sur-
geons and ethicists. However, there remains one
blind spot in the multitude of approaches in this
reader: the European Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine, for example, formulates
that ‘‘Parties to this Convention shall protect the
dignity and identity of all human beings and
guarantee everyone, without discrimination,
respect for their integrity [...] with regard to the
application of [...] medicine’’. Although this seems
to be one of the main points in ethical thinking in a
liberal society and of some relevance for the
discussed issues, it comes rather short in the
present reader.
Christian Lenk
Goettingen, Germany
Stier, M.: 2006, Ethische Probleme in der Neuro-
medizin: Identita ¨t und Autonomie in Forschung,
Diagnostik und Therapie. Campus Verlag. 377
pages. EAN 9783593380339, Price: Euro 39.90.
The overall aim of Stier is to defend the thesis that
we should regard neuro-ethics as a uniﬁed ethical
complex of problems. Although the diversity of
subjects and methods gives the impression that
neuro-medicine cannot be a uniﬁed subject of
biomedical ethics we should revise this impression
since in it we ultimately deal with the question,
‘‘wer wir als Menschen sind, wie wir sein wollen
und was wir akzeptieren ko ¨ nnen, wollen und
sollten’’ (19).
Stiers book is wide ranging, in its ﬁve sections
he deals with problems which might be the subject
of books of their own. The ﬁrst to sections are
more of the conceptual or philosophical kind while
the following ones deal with problems of applied
ethics and are related to empirical questions more
directly. In the ﬁrst section the concept of personal
identity both in philosophy and neuro-science is
analysed. Then the problem of consent in the
context of human experimentation is discussed as it
presents itself in neuro-medicine. In this second
chapter informed consent is addressed on a more
conceptual or philosophical level. Additionally the
notion of ‘‘research’’ is analysed here. The third
section presents an overview of ethical problems
which are speciﬁc for diagnosis in neuro-medicine.
The normative principle of informed consent is
discussed in the context of genetic knowledge and
questions how to deal with this new information
within our society are dealt with. The fourth
section presents those ethical problems stemming
from therapy in neuro-medicine. Coercion and
autonomy in psychiatry and the problem of per-
sonal identity in this context are main topics Stier
discusses in this section. The ﬁfth and ﬁnal section
presents an outlook: Stier deals with the neuro-
medicine of the future discussing body-transplan-
tation, hybrid brains or cyborgs. These fancy cases
are taken seriously and Stier tries to give a kind of
assessment of the ethical impact of these future
options discussing private and social consequences
on the one hand and consequences for our concept
of personal identity on the other hand.
Stiers book delivers a lot of informations and is
neither intended as a philosophical analysis of
personal identity or autonomy nor as a self-
standing book on ethics. The author admits that
questions concerning meta-ethics are not taken
into consideration but that he restricts himself to
the level of applied ethics. Although it should be
clear that one cannot separate these two levels in
the end this is acceptable since Stier always is very
careful not to draw ethical conclusions which are
too strong. His main aim is to make visible the
ethical problems in the different contexts on the
one hand and to demonstrate the reader the
options available here. In this respect Stiers book
is valuable and helpful for the reader who is in
search of orientation. From a philosophical point
of view the main problem with Stiers book is his
dealing with the notion of personal identity. This
topic is treated in much detail so that it must be
regarded as one of the centres of this book.
Unfortunately Stier only gives overviews of the
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have been developed in the last ﬁve decades. He
neither tries to discuss the positions which are not
compatible. Nor does he pay enough intention to
the problem that scientism or naturalism is a
serious problem if one discusses personal identity
from within the perspective of neuro-science or
neuro-ethics. In some sections one must even get
the impression that Stiers overall arguments
commit himself to some version of naturalism.
But since he does not discuss this at all, it is not
easy to decide this issue. Because of this a reader
who is aware of these problems will ﬁnd the book
dissatisfying or even misleading. But one should
keep in mind that Stier did not want to address
these philosophical problems.
Michael Quante
Ko¨ln, Germany
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